UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 23-1699

EMERY BARRON,
Appellant

v.

JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Corrections (DOC/PA);
KEVIN RANSOM, Warden of SCI-Dallas;
S. MILLER, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Service;
L. CRONAVER, Deputy Superintendent for Facility Management

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa.
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, No. 1:21-cv-00564

Before: PORTER, MATEY, and AMBRO, *Circuit Judges*
Argued: June 2, 2026; Filed: Nov. 24, 2026

OPINION OF THE COURT

MATEY, *Circuit Judge*.

Emery Barron was remanded to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for his repeated violent behavior while imprisoned for his role in two home invasions. Disagreeing with his segregated confinement, he brought this

action, claiming violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But this Court has long held that "[s]egregated detention is not cruel and unusual punishment *per se*," *Young v. Quinlan*, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), so we will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

I.

A.

In 2011, Emery Barron was sentenced to five to ten years' imprisonment for felony convictions of kidnapping and robbery during two home invasions. This term was substantially extended due to his repeated violent conduct as an inmate. In 2014, Barron punched a Corrections Officer, resulting in another one to two years for simple assault and 150 days of Disciplinary Custody. The following year, he attacked another Corrections Officer and was sentenced to another 35 to 70 months and 90 more days in Disciplinary Custody.

As a result of Barron's repeated violent attacks, the prison's Program Review Committee determined that he was "a danger to himself or others," App. 275, and he was placed in Administrative Custody ("AC"), a form of segregation from the general prison population. Per Department of Corrections policy, inmates placed in AC are afforded three showers a week and one hour of exercise five days a week, but they are otherwise confined to their cells. When initially placed in AC, they are prohibited from radio, tablet, television, and telephone use, but these privileges can be restored with good behavior. Inmates in AC may access educational services, visit the commissary, browse the prison library, receive religious guidance, and participate in recreational programs. Visitors are

permitted, though they are separated by protective glass. Given their propensity for danger, these inmates are restrained outside their cells.

Every inmate placed in Administrative Custody receives a weekly status review by the prison's Program Review Committee ("PRC") for the first two months, and then every ninety days. An inmate can challenge the Committee's decisions by writing to the prison's Facility Manager and, if still dissatisfied, by appeal to the Chief Hearing Examiner. An inmate's mental status is also reviewed by a psychologist every 90 days, and inmates receive weekly visits from a counselor.

Inmates in Administrative Custody can be released back into the general population by that prison's Program Review Committee. But given his repeated violent misbehavior, Barron was placed on the Restricted Release List ("RRL"), which is a roster of inmates who "pose[ ] a threat to the secure operation of the facility and where a transfer to another facility or jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern." App. 349. At the time that Barron was on the list, RRL inmates could not be released from Administrative Custody without the approval of the Secretary of Corrections.[1] But while a prison's

[1] The RRL process has apparently been revised since Barron's initial placement in 2015. Back then, placement on or removal from the RRL ran through the Regional Deputy Secretary, but final authority rested with the Secretary of Corrections or his designee. Now, the Regional Deputy Secretary can make these decisions on his own. *See* DC-ADM 802 § 1(C)(2). But, as concerning this appeal, the most relevant part of the process has not changed: a prison's Program Review

Program Review Committee could not take an inmate off the RRL, it could write to the prison's Facility Manager recommending "that an inmate on the RRL could be safely released to general population," and that recommendation would be routed for screening and, if approved, forwarded to the Secretary. App. 361. Prisoners are also entitled to yearly review of RRL status by the Secretary. Appeals of RRL placement were not permitted during Barron's time on the list.[2]

B.

After being placed in Administrative Custody at SCI Forrest, Barron received AC status reviews on November 13, November 23, December 3, and December 11, 2015, each noting that he would continue in AC "[i]n accordance with" his RRL status. App. 275. In January 2016, Barron was transferred to SCI Coal Township, where he remained on AC status. There, he racked up additional misconducts from March to May 2016, so he went back to Disciplinary Custody. But from July 2016 to August 2017, Barron stayed out of trouble and so received regular 90-day reviews of his AC status. And his good behavior brought additional privileges, including an allowance

---

Committee is unable to remove an inmate from the RRL on its own authority.

[2] This policy has apparently been changed, as PA-DOC policy now allows RRL inmates to "submit a written appeal to the Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations (EDSI), within 15 working days of receipt of the Notice of Restricted Release List Placement/Continuation." DC-ADM 802 § 2(C)(5).

for the commissary, a tablet for his cell, and regular visits from counselors.

At his August 31, 2017, 90-day review, the PRC recommended Barron for a "step-down" program: a five-phase plan to allow RRL inmates to reintegrate into the general population. Each phase of the program involved comprehensive counseling and psychological evaluation, along with a gradual restoration of privileges. Barron moved through the program and advanced to Phase 3 in January 2018, allowing him a "special visit" from his family, movies with other inmates, and frequent out-of-cell programming. He was permitted one phone call per week and allowed to purchase a television and radio for his cell.

In October 2018, Barron graduated to Phase 2, where he would enjoy increased personal freedom and group interaction. But Barron did not take well to these changes and resumed his battles with officers.[3] Because of these repeated infractions, Barron was removed from the "step-down" program and continued in Administrative Custody on the RRL.

C.

A year later, Barron was transferred to SCI Dallas, where he continued to receive visits from a counselor,

---

[3] On one occasion, Barron refused an order to clean a cell and responded with profanity. On another occasion, he threatened to kill an officer. And on yet another, he refused to leave the prison yard as instructed and again responded with profanity.

psychological evaluation, and 90-day reviews of his AC status. Barron also found the facility less satisfying, reporting uncomfortable conditions and "staff blasting music 12 hours a day." App. 506. He claims that he was only "offered 3-5 minute showers per week and 3-5 min[ute] shaves per week," App. 36, amenities that accord with DOC policy. He also claims that these were the only times he was allowed out of his cell each week, so "[t]he other 6 days 23 ½ hours is in complete isolation."[4] App. 36.

Barron was also diagnosed with sarcoidosis, causing complications in his vision. Barron had surgery on his right eye in 2021 and was approved for a medical consult for his left eye, as well as a consult with a pulmonologist to address his lung problems. But Barron did not have these appointments while at SCI Dallas, and he is now legally blind (although his voluminous *pro se* filings are neatly handwritten). Prison psychologists recorded that his mental health presented as essentially normal throughout this time, though Barron self-reports deteriorating mental health.

At the beginning of the COVID pandemic, Barron was moved temporarily to SCI Chester. His periodic AC reviews continued there, which the PRC recorded only as "PRC reviewed inmate. Remain AC due to RRL status." App. 243. In July 2021, Barron was moved to SCI Phoenix. And in

---

[4] Barron also acknowledges that he "began to use yard time once only every two months because he could not see" due to his sarcoidosis. Opening Br. 31. So even crediting Barron's allegations, it is plausible that Barron was not prevented from exercise.

November 2021, he was approved for placement in the "Intensive Management Unit," another step-down program for RRL inmates. Barron evidently completed this program successfully, as he was removed from the RRL on February 23, 2023, and graduated from the IMU two weeks later, at which point he was finally reintegrated into the general population.

D.

Barron filed a *pro se* Section 1983 complaint against Pennsylvania Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, SCI Dallas Superintendent K. Ransom, and SCI Dallas Program Review Committee members S. Miller and L. Cronauer.[5] He alleged violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages and reintegration into the general population. After discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. While that motion was pending, Barron completed the IMU, was removed from the RRL, and was reintegrated into the general population. The District Court ruled against Barron on each of his claims, and Barron timely appealed and filed a *pro se* brief. We removed this matter from the calendar and ordered the Clerk to appoint *pro bono* counsel.[6]

---

[5] This case was docketed with Cronauer's name spelled "Cronaver," as this appears to be the spelling that Barron used in his initial handwritten complaint.

[6] The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The standard of review of the order granting summary judgment is plenary. *Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ.*, 470 F.3d 535,

II.

Barron argues that his Administrative Custody violated the Eighth Amendment's constraint on public power. We evaluate such claims by asking whether: 1) the deprivation was "'sufficiently serious' and 'result[ed] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities'" (the so-called "objective" factor); and 2) the prison officials were "'deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to inmate health or safety'" (the "subjective" factor). *Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Barron does not satisfy either element.

A.

We start with the first prong. Barron argues that his time in Administrative Custody posed such an objective harm to his physical and mental health as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Prior panel decisions have suggested that three narrow conditions of solitary confinement could warrant review under the Eighth Amendment: 1) extraordinarily unsanitary living conditions where an inmate was "force[d] . . . to live in his own

---

538 (3d Cir. 2006). "We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming if, after drawing all reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party, 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,' and the moving party 'is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" *Jorjani v. N.J. Inst. of Tech.*, 151 F.4th 135, 140 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting *Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC*, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018)). We thank the Boston University Appellate Clinic for representing Barron.

excrement for four days," *Young*, 960 F.2d at 365; 2) a preexisting severe mental disorder classified as a "suicide behavior risk," *Palakovic v. Wetzel*, 854 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2017); and 3) segregated solitary confinement for 33 years, *Porter*, 974 F.3d at 443. But we have not expanded this narrow list, and we have never held that "administrative segregation [itself] . . . violate[s] the Eighth Amendment." *Griffin v. Vaughn*, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). That is because, by design, solitary confinement seeks to limit "social interaction and environmental stimulation," *Palakovic*, 854 F.3d at 231, so it cannot "*per se* violate the Constitution 'as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification.'" *Clark v. Coupe*, 55 F.4th 167, 183 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting *Young*, 960 F.2d at 364). In fact, we have specifically held that the "conditions of [A]dministrative [C]ustody" as practiced by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections "clearly do not involve a deprivation," as these conditions do not "den[y] basic human needs[ ] such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety." *Griffin*, 112 F.3d at 708, 709.

Barron makes no argument that the conditions of Administrative Custody as practiced by the PA-DOC have materially changed since the last time we considered them. Instead, he gathers two general-interest news pieces, one law review article, and a note from the local bar journal of DuPage County, Illinois. Beyond that, he provides only one peer-reviewed medical publication about the physical and mental health effects of social isolation—concerning elderly adults during the COVID-19 pandemic, not young and healthy prisoners.[7] Barron argues

[7] As is common in policy debates, conclusions about the scientific research in this area are contested. For instance, a

that our recent decision in *Porter* establishes that the "objective risk of harm from solitary confinement hinges on the lack of social interaction that individuals housed in solitary [confinement] experience." Opening Br. 22. Not so. To the contrary, we made clear in *Porter* that the objective prong was satisfied due to the "*extreme duration* of [Porter's] solitary confinement," as Porter had been segregated from the general population for 33 years. *Porter*, 974 F.3d at 444 (emphasis added). Barron never approached that multi-decade mark, placing his claims well inside the usual and well-established rule rejecting isolation alone as grounds for an Eighth Amendment claim. *Porter* does not (and cannot) contravene decades of decisions holding that solitary confinement alone does not create an objective risk of harm. *E.g.*, *Clark*, 55 F.4th at 183. So Barron

---

2016 Justice Department report on solitary confinement found, *inter alia*, that "[t]he only clear statement that can be made about the body of literature assessing the psychological effects of solitary confinement is that researchers using different methods to study different populations have come to different conclusions about the psychological effects on inmates." Natasha A. Frost & Carlos E. Monteiro, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, *Administrative Segregation in U.S. Prisons* 16 (2016), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249749.pdf. "[F]or many researchers studying solitary confinement, the practice raises not only empirical questions but also moral and ethical concerns that will persist regardless of the breadth or depth of the evidence base. Across a literature replete with highly charged emotions, interpreting the evidence and separating evidence from strongly held beliefs have become exceptionally difficult." *Id.* at 23.

cannot convert his ordinary Administrative Custody status into an Eighth Amendment violation.

B.

If we were to find an objectively serious deprivation, we would have to proceed to the subjective element, where Barron must show that prison officials knew of the deprivation but were "deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]" to the risk to his health and safety. *Id.* at 183–84 (citing *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991)). Such knowledge "can be inferred from the objective circumstances of a prison's conditions if such conditions pose an obvious danger to the inmates." *Id.* at 184 (citing *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 825). But even if officials were aware of the adverse effects of solitary confinement, they took reasonable steps to provide for Barron's mental health. Barron's claim thus fails at this step, too.

Barron argues that the then-Secretary of Corrections, John Wetzel, was aware of the "well documented" adverse effects of solitary confinement due to concessions he had made in previous cases, including *Porter*. Opening Br. 31–32; *see also Porter*, 974 F.3d at 445 ("In a past case, Defendant Wetzel conceded that long-term solitary confinement poses serious risks . . . ."). And he argues that the other Defendants were aware of the effects of solitary confinement because DOC policies "specifically recognize the mental health risks posed by solitary confinement." Opening Br. 33 (quoting *Porter*, 974 F.3d at 446).[8]

[8] *See, e.g.*, App. 349 ("If the inmate has a mental illness, the PRC should explore the feasibility of placing him/her

But even if the prison officials had acknowledged the possible problems some inmates encounter when their actions demand administrative isolation, that would not have created a duty to release Barron back into the general population. Rather, they would have had to "take reasonable measures to abate" the harms that Barron was suffering. *Porter*, 974 F.3d at 444 (quoting *Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.*, 806 F.3d 210, 229 (3d Cir. 2015)). And that is what they did here. Barron received regular access to mental health evaluations to confirm his mental health and was repeatedly offered opportunities to earn his return to the general population.

Moreover, "[i]n evaluating the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test, we may also consider whether officials 'had a legitimate penological purpose' behind their conduct." *Id.* at 446 (citing *Ricks v. Shover*, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018)). Here, the record demonstrates that they did. Barron was first sent to Administrative Custody after repeated assaults on Corrections Officers. He incurred additional misconducts while in AC, and when officials at SCI Coal Township attempted to help Barron transition back into the general population, their efforts were thwarted by repeated altercations that Barron provoked, including threatening the life of a guard. All

---

into . . . an alternative, as long as the inmate's safety is not jeopardized. If the inmate's safety cannot be reasonably assured in any status other than AC, then appropriate mental health services must be provided while the inmate remains in AC status."); App. 354 ("If [an] inmate's [solitary] confinement continues for *more than 30 calendar days*, a mental health assessment *shall* be completed at least every 90 calendar days.").

in all, Barron's "history of institutional violence toward staff and inmates" explained his continued segregation, a decision that served a legitimate penological purpose. App. 433.[9]

III.

Barron next argues that his procedural due process rights were violated by the Defendants' failure to provide "meaningful and regular reviews" of his continued placement in solitary confinement. Opening Br. 39. But in fact, Barron was provided all the process he was due concerning his status in Administrative Custody.

A.

Case law sketches a two-step inquiry into whether prison officials have violated an inmate's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. First, the inmate must establish a deprivation of a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in "life, liberty, or property." *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). An inmate is deprived of a protected liberty interest when he faces "restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S.

---

[9] And even if Barron did make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, each of the Defendants would be protected by qualified immunity. Barron cannot show violation of a clearly established right, as in *Porter* we specifically noted that "[w]e do not hold that all inmates in solitary confinement . . . have been subjected to an Eighth Amendment violation." 974 F.3d at 447 n.12.

472, 484 (1995) (citation omitted). An "atypical and significant hardship" is discerned according to: "(1) the duration of the challenged conditions; and (2) whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." *Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 848 F.3d 549, 560 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

At this first step, Barron argues that he has a "liberty interest in avoiding prolonged placement in solitary confinement." Opening Br. 37. But we have defined "prolonged placement" as one involving a much longer period of confinement "with no prospect of immediate release in the near future." *See Shoats v. Horn*, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Barron enjoyed the keys to his own release back to regular custody, with his return only frustrated by his repeated refusal to follow ordinary rules of behavior.

Barron also fails step two of the procedural due process test: he does not show that the process he was afforded for any deprivation of that interest was inadequate. An inmate who is first placed in administrative segregation is not entitled to a "detailed adversary proceeding," but only to "notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. . . . So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied." *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 474, 476 (1983) (footnote omitted). This Court has confirmed that this same standard applies to continuing placement in Administrative Custody. *Shoats*, 213 F.3d at 144–47.

As in *Shoats*, Barron has received the process to which he is entitled. Barron had regular review by each prison's PRC,

before which he could plead his case for his return to the general population. *See id.* at 147. Prison officials could permissibly decide to keep him in Administrative Custody "based on past conduct that furnishes a basis for predicting that the inmate will engage in future acts of violence if corrective measures are not taken." *Fraise v. Terhune*, 283 F.3d 506, 523 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing *Shoats*, 213 F.3d at 146–47). Documents from Barron's RRL reviews make clear that he was kept in Administrative Custody because of his "highly assaultive behavior toward staff," App. 424, his "50 misconducts since his incarceration," App. 431, "[t]hreatening an [e]mployee and [a]busive [l]anguage," App. 431, and "poor progress in the RRL step-down program," App. 431.[10]

---

[10] And as with his Eighth Amendment claim, even if Barron did make out a procedural due process violation, the Defendants would be shielded by qualified immunity. Barron has no clearly established right to additional process for his AC reviews, as we have precedentially concluded that "confinement in administrative custody . . . , in accordance with the DOC regulations, . . . [with] the opportunity to present [ ] views personally at each review," is "sufficient to pass constitutional muster." *Shoats*, 213 F.3d at 147. And Barron has no clearly established right to any process regarding his continuation on the RRL, as multiple panels of this Court, though in nonprecedential opinions, have found no protected liberty interest at all implicated by RRL placement. *See, e.g.*, *Bracey v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 686 F. App'x 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); *Huertas v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 533 F. App'x 64, 67 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); *Bowen v. Ryan*, 248 F. App'x 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

B.

Against this conclusion, Barron makes three arguments: "(1) He had no opportunity to be heard by a decisionmaker, rendering any so-called reviews of his solitary-confinement status meaningless; (2) he did not receive 'regular' reviews; and (3) he did not receive meaningful statements of reasons about why he remained in solitary, so he had no notice about how to earn release from solitary." Opening Br. 39. None persuade.

First, Barron argues that his opportunity to be heard was "meaningless" because he could be heard only by the Program Review Committee, which could not authorize Barron's return to the general population due to his presence on the Restricted Release List. Opening Br. 40. But Barron ignores that the PRC had the authority to "make a recommendation" to the Secretary of Corrections (through the prison chain of command) that an inmate on the RRL "could be safely released to general population." App. 361. Indeed, this appears to be what the PRC did when it recommended him for enrollment in the step-down programs. Nor was this process insufficient simply because he could not argue directly to the Secretary of Corrections. *Shoats*, 213 F.3d at 145 (requiring "merely" opportunity "to present his views to the prison official [first] charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation" (quoting *Hewitt*, 459 U.S. at 476)).[11]

[11] Moreover, the "final decision maker" concerning the PRC's decision to continue his Administrative Custody was

Second, Barron's status was regularly reviewed by the PRC every ninety days.

Finally, Barron cannot claim he could not know the standards of behavior necessary to return to general confinement. His yearly RRL reviews offered meaningful guidance, pointing to the violent offenses that caused segregation, his recurring misconduct, and his failure in the step-down program. Combined with the periodic PRC reviews, these explanations satisfy the "meaningful review" appropriate for administrative decisions on confinement. *Williams*, 848 F.3d at 576 (emphasis omitted).

IV.

Lastly, Barron argues that one of the Defendants—L. Cronauer, a PRC member at SCI Dallas—violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.[12] Due to his sarcoidosis, Barron was approved by prison doctors for medical consultations regarding cataract surgery and his respiratory ailments. Barron alleges that he did not receive these appointments until 2023, when he was housed at SCI Phoenix, and attributes the delay to his later diagnosis as legally blind. But

---

not the Secretary—it was the Chief Hearing Examiner, to whom Barron had the right to appeal and be heard.

[12] Barron seems to base this claim on Cronauer's signed document acknowledging that the PRC was "looking into [Barron's] upcoming medical appointments." App. 208. Cronauer, along with Defendant S. Miller, was apparently one of the members of the Program Review Committee at SCI Dallas.

this claim fails because Barron fails to show that Cronauer had any involvement in the scheduling of these appointments.

We have written that "prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs by 'intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.'" *Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.*, 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). "In order to sustain this constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that 'the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and (2) an objective showing that 'those needs were serious.'" *Id.* (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting *Rouse v. Plantier*, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). But "[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have *personal* involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of *respondeat superior*." *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Barron has not shown that Cronauer was personally involved with the scheduling of his medical appointments. Barron cites a single record of a PRC meeting, signed by Cronauer, where the Committee agreed to "look into [Barron's] upcoming medical appointments and pending transfer." App. 208. But this meeting occurred on June 2, 2021, and Barron was transferred from SCI Dallas to SCI Phoenix a month later. Barron does not show that Cronauer had any involvement in his medical care before the first review, or that Cronauer had any involvement in his medical care after he was moved. Indeed, all he shows is that during the time that Cronauer purportedly had some involvement in Barron's medical care, Cronauer was

helping Barron. That is not enough to make out an Eighth Amendment claim.

* * *

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court's decision.

Counsel for Appellant

James P. Davy
ALL RISE TRIAL & APPELLATE

Madeline Meth
Steven Mitchell
Carolyn Sacco **[Argued]**
Shaina Sikka
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW APPELLATE CLINIC

Counsel for Appellees

Jeffrey Paladina **[Argued]**
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS