

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-1836

MYRON N. CRISDON,
Appellant

v.

NORTH GATE 1 APARTMENTS; ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES;
ASHA TAYLOR, Property Manager; JUDGE RICHARD F. WELLS

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-11537)
District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2026

Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and ROTH, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed: October 15, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Myron Crisdon, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals from the District Court's order dismissing his civil rights complaint with prejudice. We will affirm.

I.

Crisdon filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that his landlord Northgate 1, a Northgate manager Asha Taylor, and the private security firm Allied Universal illegally ejected him from his apartment and confiscated his belongings. The Court granted Crisdon leave to proceed IFP, dismissed his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and granted him leave to amend. Crisdon amended his complaint to include allegations that defendant New Jersey state court Judge Richard F. Wells violated his Due Process rights during his state court eviction proceedings.

The District Court screened Crisdon's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it. The Court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at least in part pursuant to the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and that Crisdon's claims against Judge Wells were barred by judicial immunity. In light of those rulings, the Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Crisdon's state-law claims. Crisdon appealed.¹

¹ After Crisdon filed his notice of appeal, the District Court also denied his motion for reconsideration. Because Crisdon did not file a timely new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying his motion for reconsideration, we do not consider that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); *Carrascosa v. McGuire*, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).

In our Court, Crisdon filed a document in support of his appeal, as well as a pro se brief.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and “[o]ur review of the district court's application of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is plenary.” *Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P.*, 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of judicial immunity. *See Carver v. Foerster*, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996).

III.

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of the case. As the Court correctly noted, Crisdon asserted only a single type of federal claim, alleging that Judge Wells violated his due process rights. To the extent, if any, that Crisdon sued Judge Wells in an effort to directly appeal the state court’s judgment in federal court, the District Court properly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over those claims, pursuant to the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP*, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the doctrine applies when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” (citation modified)).

To the extent that Crisdon alleged that Judge Wells violated some independent right he possessed, *see Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP*, 615 F.3d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 2010), Crisdon’s allegations against Judge Wells arose exclusively from his conduct while acting as a judge, and “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” *Azubuko v. Royal*, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Therefore, the District Court’s dismissal of those claims was proper.

Given the dismissal of Crisdon’s only federal claims, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); *see also Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.*, 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.