

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2568

MAURICE MUHAMMAD,
Appellant

v.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS;
PENNSYLVANIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS;
GREATER LEHIGH VALLEY MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE;
ALLYSON LYSAGHT, ESQ.; JUSTIN POREMBO;
JOHN DOES 1-10 (UNKNOWN PARTIES)

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:24-cv-05543)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 6, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed: October 7, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Maurice Muhammad appeals *pro se* from the District Court’s order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice. We will affirm.

Muhammad is a licensed realtor and paid member of the National Association of Realtors (NAR) hailing from Allentown, Pennsylvania. He commenced this lawsuit in October 2024 by filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against NAR and others after his access to the multiple listing service (MLS)—an online database available to NAR members to assist clients in selling their homes—was terminated for nonpayment of membership fees and failure to abide by a code of ethics following disciplinary proceedings. Muhammad asserts violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Fair Housing Act, federal civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983), and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTCPL); he also alleges that he experienced racial discrimination during disciplinary proceedings. He sought a preliminary injunction requiring NAR to restore access to the MLS for him and other brokers at his firm, which the District Court denied before dismissing his operative pleading on Defendants’ motion for failure to state a claim. Muhammad appeals.¹

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order, accepting as true Muhammad’s well-pleaded factual allegations. *See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action*, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to

¹ Muhammad’s MLS access was restored during the pendency of this appeal.

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Muhammad forfeited any challenge he might have raised to the dismissal of his Fair Housing Act and UTPCPL claims by not raising them in his brief. *See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist.*, 877 F.3d 136, 145-48 (3d Cir. 2017). The arguments he does raise largely are undeveloped, consist more of bullet points than narrative discussion or analysis, have no accompanying record citations, and frequently purport to rely upon “well-known, ongoing national antitrust litigation” in other jurisdictions, case cites for which he does not supply. *See, e.g.*, C.A. Doc. 20 at unpaginated pdf 5-6, 12, 17. Those deficiencies aside, we agree with the District Court’s thorough review of Muhammad’s second amended complaint: even under the “more pronounced” liberal pleading standard applicable to pro se plaintiffs, *see Garrett v. Wexford Health*, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)), Muhammad’s pleadings are rife with conclusory allegations or fail to assert sufficient facts to satisfy the most basic elements of any of the statutes he invokes, *see id.* (citing *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Dismissal was appropriate.

The District Court also was well within its discretion to deny Muhammad another bite at the apple by dismissing the matter with prejudice on grounds of futility. In granting his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, the court advised Muhammad “to address all alleged deficiencies set forth in” Defendants’ motion to dismiss because no further amendment would be granted. *See* ECF Doc. 47 at 1-2. He

did not heed that warning, with predictable results. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.