

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-3255

JAMES ROBERT TICE,
Appellant

v.

WAYNE JOSEPH ALEXANDER; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA; FRED P. ANTHONY; SUSAN PARADISE
BAXTER; CATHY BISsoon; ROBERT BLAKELY; JOHN A. BOZZA; PATRICK M.
CAREY; LINDA B. COHEN; COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY;
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE; DOMINICK D. DIPAOLO; DIANE DOMBROWSKI; STEPHANIE
DOMITROVICH, Honorable; EMILY C. DOWNING; EDMUND L THOMAS
ADOLESCENT CENTER; ERIE COUNTY JUVENILE PROBATION; ERIE POLICE
DEPARTMENT; BRADLEY H. FOULK; AMELIA J. GOODRICH; JAY HABAS;
HARBORCREEK YOUTH; JENNIFER M. HERRMANN; INNOCENCE PROJECT;
LAURA S. IRWIN; RICHARD A. LANZILLO; ANTHONY A. LOGUE; PAUL
MANZI; ROBERT J. MARINO; PAM MARSH; LORI J. MASON; MILLCREEK
POLICE; MISSION BROADCASTING INC; PETER NAKOSKI; NEW CASTLE
MAXIMUM SECURITY JUVENILE PRISON; NEXSTAR MEDIA GROUP INC;
BRENDA NICHOLS; CHRISTOPHER PARIS; PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICES; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES;
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OFFICE OF CHILDREN
YOUTH & FAMILIES; PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATOR;
BARBARA PERCY; JIM RUMM; STS; KATHLEEN A. SCIBETTA; NANCIE J.
SMITH; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA; U.S. ATTORNEY WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA;
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JIM K. VOGEL; WFXP FOX 66;
HARRY E. WILSON; FRANCIS D. WYMARD; DAVID ZIEGLER; JULIE
ZOUMBARIS

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00207)
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 25, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and ROTH, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed: October 19, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

James Tice, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals from the District Court's orders dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

Tice filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging constitutional violations against over 60 different defendants stemming from purportedly illegal court proceedings held against him throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim but provided leave to amend, at which point Tice filed his operative amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Tice reiterated his allegations about the 1990s and early 2000s court proceedings, and also alleged that he

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

was denied fundamental rights owed to him by the defendants on the basis of his allegedly royal and divine bloodlines. On October 8, 2025, the District Court dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

On October 27, 2025, Tice filed a Rule 60(b) motion, which the District Court denied on October 29, 2025. Tice appealed. In our Court, Tice has filed a pro se brief, as well as numerous motions asking the Court to invalidate judicial orders that were issued against him in the 1990s and take judicial notice of his ancient and royal bloodlines.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). *See Allah v. Seiverling*, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion, *see Cox v. Horn*, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014), except for motions under Rule 60(b)(4), over which our review is plenary. *See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White*, 536 F.3d 244, 251 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).

III.

We agree with the judgment of the District Court. To the extent Tice's operative amended complaint alleges that Tice is descended from God and the prophets of Abrahamic religions and, further, is entitled to the English throne by virtue of his royal bloodline, we agree with the District Court that he has not stated a plausible claim for relief. *See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The District Court properly dismissed Tice's claims stemming from court proceedings that occurred between 1990 and 2006 because, as our Court has previously

informed Tice, they are all barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. *See Tice v. Wilson*, No. 24-3165, 2025 WL 1527477, at *2 (3d Cir. May 29, 2025) (per curiam) (holding that Tice’s similar claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and that no tolling applies); *see also Kach v. Hose*, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose, and the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years). To the extent that Tice seeks to overturn any of his state-court convictions, he must bring those claims in a habeas corpus petition, not a § 1983 action. *See Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

After granting Tice leave to amend his complaint once, the District Court did not err in determining that providing further leave to amend would be futile. *See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of Tice’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), as that motion failed to plausibly allege “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); *see Stridiron v. Stridiron*, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). Nor did the Court err in denying Tice’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4), as the District Court’s judgment was not void. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); *see United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa*, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (defining a void judgment as one that is “premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the

opportunity to be heard”). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.¹

¹ All of appellant’s pending motions are denied.