NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-3398

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CARLOS CEGLEDI,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:08-cr-00218-001)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 10, 2026

Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN and ROTH, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed: November 12, 2026)

OPINION[*]

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[*] This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

ROTH, *Circuit Judge*

Carlos Cegledi, proceeding *pro se*, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying without prejudice his motion for early termination of supervised release. Because the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has since accepted jurisdiction over Cegledi's supervised release, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.

I.[1]

In 2010, the District Court sentenced Cegledi to 234 months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Cegledi was released from federal custody in December 2023, and later moved to live and work in Philadelphia, where the United States Probation Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania supervised him. Jurisdiction over his supervised release, however, remained in the Middle District.

In June 2025, Cegledi moved for early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). On November 17, 2025, the Middle District denied Cegledi's motion without prejudice based on its decision to transfer jurisdiction of Cegledi's supervised release to the Eastern District, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3605. Cegledi appealed the District Court's denial on December 1, 2025. The Eastern District accepted jurisdiction on December 15, 2025.

[1] We write primarily for the parties, so we recite only the facts essential to our decision.

II.[2]

Cegledi argues that the Middle District erred by denying his motion solely based on its decision to transfer jurisdiction to the Eastern District. He asserts that the District Court should have reached the merits of his "fully briefed" motion and considered the factors enumerated in § 3583(e).[3]

Section 3605 authorizes a district court to "transfer jurisdiction over a . . . person on supervised release to the district court for any other district to which the person is required to proceed as a condition of his . . . release, or is permitted to proceed, with the concurrence of such court."[4] The transferee court then "is authorized to exercise all powers over" the releasee, including the authority to terminate supervised release under § 3583(e)(1).[5]

Even assuming the Middle District should have reached the merits of Cegledi's motion, the Eastern District accepted the § 3605 transfer on December 15, 2025. At that point, the Eastern District assumed exclusive jurisdiction over Cegledi's supervised

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[2] We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We ordinarily review the denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Melvin*, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020). Because we will dismiss this appeal as moot, we do not reach the merits of the District Court's denial.

[3] Cegledi Br. 5, 9. Cegledi's briefing contains citations and quotations that do not exist, including a fictious Sixth Circuit decision (*United States v. Tavarez*, 2025 WL 2991234 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2025)) and fabricated language attributed to *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56 (1982) ("because jurisdiction . . . is being transferred"). Cegledi Br. 15; Reply Br. 7–8. Although we construe *pro se* filings liberally, litigants remain responsible for the accuracy of the authorities and quotations they submit. We warn Cegledi that future filings containing fabricated authorities or quotations may result in sanctions.

[4] 18 U.S.C. § 3605.

[5] *Id.*

release.[6] In other words, even if we were to remand to the Middle District, it no longer has the authority to terminate or modify Cegledi's supervised release. Because the Middle District denied Cegledi's motion without prejudice, he remains free to seek early termination in the Eastern District. We accordingly decline to disturb the status quo ante and will dismiss Cegledi's appeal as moot.[7]

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.

[6] *United States v. El Herman*, 971 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining "the transferor court no longer has jurisdiction to exercise the powers that may be exercised by the transferee court" once transfer occurs); *see also United States v. Fernandez*, 379 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2004); *Johnson*, 861 F.3d at 478.

[7] *See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp.*, 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996) ("If developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot."); *see also United States v. Sastrom*, 96 F.4th 33, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2024) (declining to require retrieval of a transferred case because doing so offered little practical benefit).