

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 26-1026

JASIR MASSEY-CAMPBELL,
Appellant

v.

BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE CORP.;
DANIEL GAUDREAU, in his official capacity

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-04146)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed August 19, 2026)

OPINION*

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM

Before the Court is an appeal from pro se appellant Jasir Massey-Campbell, who brought suit against Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation (“Bridgecrest”)¹ and its CFO, Daniel Gaudreau. After the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Massey-Campbell’s amended complaint, Massey-Campbell filed several post-judgment motions, all of which were denied. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

Massey-Campbell’s amended complaint asserted claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as well as a claim for breach of contract. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Massey-Campbell moved for summary judgment; the defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for a judgment on the pleadings. After briefing, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint, explaining that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Gaudreau, and that Massey-Campbell failed to state a claim for relief against Bridgecrest.² The District Court entered its judgment by separate document on October 2, 2025.

¹ Appellees aver that Massey-Campbell improperly named Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC as “Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation.” For simplicity, we will refer to the entity as “Bridgecrest.”

² The District Court’s dismissal of the amended complaint mooted Massey-Campbell’s motion for summary judgment and the defendants’ cross-motion for a judgment on the pleadings. *See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp.*, 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996).

Twenty-eight days later, on October 30, Massey-Campbell moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, amend his complaint, and strike the defendants' prior allegations and submitted exhibit.³ The District Court denied the motions on November 3. Then, on December 1, Massey-Campbell moved to vacate or reconsider per Rules 59(e) and 60(b) the District Court's order denying his post-judgment motions and its dismissal of his amended complaint. The District Court denied that motion on December 9, and Massey-Campbell filed a notice of appeal on January 6, 2026.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but the scope of this appeal is limited to the denial of Massey's motion to reconsider. Massey-Campbell's opening brief mostly takes issue with the District Court's order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss his amended complaint. But we lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that decision because Massey-Campbell's notice of appeal was untimely as to the District Court's dismissal order. *See Bowles v. Russell*, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (citation omitted) (explaining that the time requirements to file a notice of appeal in a civil case are "mandatory and jurisdictional").

³ We liberally construe all of these requests as filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). *See Ahmed v. Dragovich*, 297 F.3d 201, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that, once judgment is entered, Rules 59 and 60 govern the opening of that judgment); *Banister v. Davis*, 590 U.S. 504, 520 n.9 (2020) (explaining that a motion for relief from judgment made within 28 days of the entry of that judgment is properly construed as a motion under Rule 59(e)).

When, like here, the United States is not a party, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order that the party seeks to appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The District Court entered its order dismissing the amended complaint in October, but Massey-Campbell did not appeal until January. While Massey-Campbell's initial Rule 59(e) motions tolled the time to appeal, *see* Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), his subsequent motion to vacate or reconsider did not, *see Turner v. Evers*, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984). Massey-Campbell did not file his notice of appeal within 30 days of either the District Court's order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss or its order denying his first round of Rule 59(e) motions. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over the District Court's order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the scope of the appeal is limited to the denial of reconsideration.

With regard to his motion for reconsideration, Massey-Campbell does not address the Rules 59(e) or 60(b) standards and confines his argument to one sentence asserting that we should vacate the orders denying post-judgment relief for the same reasons that we should vacate the dismissal order. Even with the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, this statement is not sufficient to raise an issue on appeal. *See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp.*, 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (explaining that "a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court"); *see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.*, 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that pro se litigants "must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants"). In any event, Massey-Campbell could not use his

post-judgment motions to relitigate the same arguments that he had advanced in his previous filings. *See Lazaridis v. Wehmer*, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); *United States v. Fiorelli*, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's judgment.