

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 26-1704

BRUCE NORTON,
Appellant

v.

JOSEPH C. ADAMS, in his official capacity; MATTHEW D. MENGES, in his official capacity; YORK COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for Saxton Asset Securities Trust2007-2 Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates Series 2007-2; JESSICA N. MANIS, Esq., in her official capacity; and STERN & EISENBERG, P.C.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1:25-cv-01216)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 25, 2026

Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed September 1, 2026)

OPINION*

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM

This case was last before us in *Norton v. Adams*, C.A. No. 25-2361, 2025 WL 2231797 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (per curiam) (“*Norton I*”), where we affirmed an order refusing to enjoin a sheriff’s sale of appellant Bruce Norton’s property in York County, Pennsylvania. Background facts from that opinion are incorporated here by reference.

In short, Norton filed this pro se civil rights action after a string of losses in state foreclosure proceedings, *see Deutsche Bank [] v. Norton*, 350 A.3d 135 (table), 2025 WL 2838434, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025); *Deutsche Bank [] v. Norton*, 276 A.3d 235 (table), 2022 WL 730594, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022)—results he attributes to “systematic practices that deny entire categories of constitutional protections,” and to discrimination “based solely on his status as a pro se litigant.” App. Vol. II at 14, 18. Norton’s amended complaint raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. For relief, he requested a declaration that the foreclosure proceedings were constitutionally infirm. He also sought injunctive relief, to include federal court oversight of, and defendants’ compliance with the law in, “all future judicial proceedings” in state court. App. Vol. II at 18.¹

The District Court dismissed Norton’s case with prejudice, over his objections, after adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report recommending (1) granting the defendants’ motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and (2) denying Norton’s latest motion for a preliminary injunction. Still pro se, Norton timely filed this appeal.

¹ According to Norton, he is not involved in any “ongoing” proceedings in state court. Br. 30.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is de novo. *See Reading v. N. Hanover Twp., N.J.*, 124 F.4th 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2024) (legal conclusions supporting denial of preliminary injunction); *United States ex rel. Bookwalter v. UPMC*, 946 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); *U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P.*, 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (amendment futility).

We have considered Norton’s arguments on appeal—none demonstrates reversible error.² His motion for a preliminary injunction was rightly denied, and his amended complaint rightly dismissed with prejudice, for substantially the reasons given in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and anticipated in *Norton I*. *See* 2025 WL 2231797, at *3 (discussing, e.g., immunity, cognizability, preclusion, and plausibility issues with Norton’s claims). Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. The motion of certain appellees for leave to file a supplemental appendix is denied.

² For example, any error by the District Court in classifying Norton’s Report objections as “general” and undeserving of de novo review was harmless given the outcome of our own de novo review. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2111. As another example, it would have indeed been futile to allow an amended pleading “that would: (1) eliminate all requests for injunctive relief; (2) dismiss all claims against Deutsche Bank, the private attorneys, and the law firm; and (3) seek only declaratory relief against the two judges[.]” Br. 36. Even assuming adjudicatory error by the state judges, that would not—without additional, plausible facts heretofore absent from this record—give Norton the right to secure from the District Court a declaration that his constitutional rights were violated. *See Gryger v. Burke*, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) (“We are not at liberty to conjecture that the trial court acted under an interpretation of the state law different from that which we might adopt and then set up our own interpretation as a basis for declaring that due process has been denied. We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question.”); *see also Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP*, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (providing futility standard).