NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 26-2210

SAJID RAZA,
Appellant

v.

ADAM ZUCKER a/k/a/ADAM SCOTT ZUCKER, as Executor of the Estate of JEFFREY C. ZUCKER, Deceased; BRENDEN D. MOLES; SHEERA G. ENGRISSEI

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-09712)
District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2026
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and CHUNG, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed: November 19, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Sajid Raza, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against various attorneys involved in litigating Raza's criminal and civil cases. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

Raza filed a complaint in the District Court against a New Jersey state court Judge, numerous New Jersey prosecutors and other state officials in their individual and official capacities, and various private attorneys and individuals who were involved in Raza's civil and criminal court proceedings. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and the District Court dismissed, with prejudice, Raza's claims against the Judge and the state defendants in their individual capacities. The Court dismissed Raza's other claims without prejudice, granting leave to amend so that Raza could cure deficiencies that the Court identified at a hearing. Raza then filed an amended complaint against a handful of state entities (the state of New Jersey, Gloucester Township, and Camden County), state officials (a police officer and an assistant public defender) and several private attorneys; the Court then granted dismissal motions filed by the state entities and state officials, dismissing those parties with prejudice.

With the District Court's leave, Raza filed a second amended complaint (SAC), alleging two § 1983 claims of conspiracy and malicious prosecution against the private attorneys who represented him during his criminal and landlord-tenant court proceedings; he further alleged a handful of New Jersey state-law claims stemming from the same incidents. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, and the Court, finding that Raza's SAC

was still deficient, dismissed his federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed his state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a complaint dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. *See Schmidt v. Skolas*, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014). We accept the facts pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co.*, 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).

III.

As an initial matter, Raza states in his opening brief that he seeks to challenge the District Court's dismissal of his initial and first-amended complaints. However, he fails to develop any arguments that relate to the defendants who were dismissed through those orders. Therefore, he has forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of his original and first amended complaints. *See In re Wettach*, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). To the extent that Raza presents the District Court's earlier dismissals as proof that the deficiencies in his SAC were curable, and that the District Court was therefore too harsh when it dismissed that complaint with prejudice, that argument fails because, as noted below, further amendment would have been futile.

The District Court properly determined that Raza's § 1983 claims, alleging that his attorneys engaged in malicious prosecution and conspiracy, are too vague and conclusory to survive dismissal. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."). The District Court determined that Raza's conspiracy allegations lacked any factual basis, and were in fact thoroughly undermined by the documents he included as exhibits with his complaint. *See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.*, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that, "[t]o decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record"). For example, Raza complained that his attorney failed to file a bail motion on his behalf,[1] and that his favorable presentence report was never presented to the state criminal court to support a bail effort. However, as the District Court noted, Raza specifically attached to his SAC a transcript from a bail hearing that took place on January 10, 2020, where his attorney argued a bail motion on his behalf. Another bail motion hearing took place months later in April 2020. Contrary to his assertions, Raza's presentence report, which classified him as having no prior criminal record, was mentioned multiple times at different hearings in support of his bail motions. When questioned by the District Court Judge about his allegations, Raza's responses did not offer clarity and were instead fanciful and conclusory, such as his assertion that his lawyer conspired with a judge to "plot[] [his] murder in jail without trial." ECF Doc. 119 at 5. In sum, Raza's complaint failed to plead any factual content that allows a Court to reasonably infer that his attorneys conspired against him, and in fact Raza's SAC included documentation that contradicts those very claims.

[1] It is difficult to determine that this is what he was alleging based on his SAC, but he clarified as much at a hearing that took place before the District Court Judge.

The District Court also properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, as none of the attorneys named as defendants in Raza's SAC were plausibly alleged to be state actors or prosecutors, and were thus not involved in initiating or continuing any prosecution against Raza. *See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc.*, 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004) ("To establish a claim under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show that the defendants 1) were state actors who 2) violated [her] rights under the Constitution or federal law."); *see* ECF Doc. 119 at 14. Given the dismissal of Raza's two federal claims, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); *see also Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.*, 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017).

On appeal, Raza's primary argument is that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to provide him further leave to amend. While Raza is correct that pro se pleadings should be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys, *see Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), it is still the case that a pro se litigant "must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." *Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.*, 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Considering the fanciful nature of his § 1983 allegations, and after granting Raza leave to amend his complaint twice, the District Court did not err in declining to provide further leave to amend. *See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); *see also LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council*, 985 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting that amendment would be futile where a plaintiff had been granted leave to amend twice and offered no news facts in support of amendment).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.